Earticle

초록

영어

Tor is a popular low-latency anonymous communication system which could provide anonymity and anti-censorship. Based on previous researches on de- anonymization of Tor, this paper proposes a novel approach to attack users’ guard selection which can pose great threat against Tor users' anonymity. Under the current design of Tor, once entry guards are compromised, the probability that an attacker observes both ends of a Tor circuit will be highly improved. Actual and simulated experiments both show that an attacker (e.g., a local or national government which have the power to monitor a Tor user’s internet connection) can successfully compromise a specific Tor user’s entry guard in about 30 minutes, and this can further help de-anonymize the user’s anonymous communication.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Related Work
 3. Attacking Against Entry Guard Selection
  3.1. Basis
  3.2. Attack
  3.3. Analysis
 4. Experimental Results
 5. Conclusions
 References

키워드

저자

• Quangang Li [ School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China ]
• Peipeng Liu [ Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190,China ]
• Zhiguang Qin [ School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605