Earticle

초록

영어

In the setting of (m,n) rational secret sharing, n rational players wish to share a secret s , arbitrarily m players can reconstruct it, they always choose the strategies which can bring them more utilities. The security requirement includes privacy, correctness and fairness. Fairness is a central objective of the rational secret sharing scheme, complete fair means either all players get the secret s or none of them get it, but most existing schemes do not meet this nature. In this work, a rational secret sharing protocol is proposed, which neither need particular communication channel, nor assume the existence of honest minority, in addition, the scheme can resist the collusion attack with k(k  m) players, and can achieve sequential equilibrium. Theoretical analysis shows that the proposed protocol is complete fair.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
  1.1 Related Work
  1.2 Our Contribution
  1.3 Paper Outline
 2. Preliminaries
  2.1 Game Theory Model and Definition
  2.2 Non-interactive Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
 3. Fair Rational Secret Sharing Protocol
  3.1 Initialization
  3.2 Distribution Phase
  3.3 Player's Protocol
 4. Protocol Analysis
  4.1 Security Analysis
  4.2 Player’s Motivation Analysis
  4.3 Sequential Equilibrium Analysis
 5. Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Wang Jie [ College of Mathematics and Computer Science, Shanxi Normal University, Linfen 041004, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605