Recently, many commercial standardization arrangements incorporating patented technologies in a standard have been vigorously made. Standardization could lead many beneficial effects of product interoperability and compatibility reducing barriers to entry, or creation of unified platforms for development of new products. However, the standardization including certain patented technologies would cause the incorporated technology to be a necessary factor for businesses to survive in the relevant market adopting the standard. For this reason, standardization process may be affected by patent proprietors wanting certain standard including their patented technology to be adopted. Usually, Standard?setting Organization(SSO) require their members to reveal all their pending or existing patents before adoption of a standard. Sometimes, the SSO could try to avoid particular patents as necessary factor in a standard when it becomes aware of the patents. The SSO’s behavior could allow the adopted standard to be opened participants in a relevant market. However, patent proprietors have been reluctant to disclose all their existing or pending patents in standard?setting process. In several cases, this incomplete disclosure has been combined with a refusal to license or a demand for excessive terms after the standard requiring the proprietors’ patents has been set. Moreover, SSOs would demand their members to promise to license an unidentified patent on FRAND (fair, reasonable and non?discriminatory) terms to use its patented technology. In that case, false FRAND commitment may be part of a strategy designed to influence the SSO's technology choice. In this reason, the breach of FRAND commitment case was brought to the court with accusation of violation of antitrust law. The patent proprietor’s concealment of patent or false commitment could affect competition to the extent that it leads the SSO to adopt a lower quality standard rather than otherwise the SSO would choose. For this reason, when patent proprietor’s behavior causes the SSO not to verify the openness of the claimed patent, it should be under investigation of a competition agency.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론 Ⅱ. 산업표준의 유형과 의의 1. 산업표준의 종류와 의의 2. 산업의 표준과 표준에 편입된 기술에 대한 특허권의 보호 Ⅲ. 표준책정 과정에서 발생하는 경쟁법적 문제점 1. 표준화 기구의 표준책정과 경쟁제한성 2. 기만적인 공적표준 책정의 유도와 경쟁제한성 3. 사실상의 표준책정과 문제점 IV. 표준책정후의 특허권 행사의 문제점 1. 표준특허기술의 특허권 행사와 독점금지법 적용 2. 표준특허기술에 대한 필수설비 이론 적용의 문제점 V. 결론 참고문헌 Abstract
본 학회는 지식재산 및 관련 제도(특허, 실용신안, 상표, 디자인, 영업비밀, 저작권, 반도체칩, 컴퓨터프로그램, 데이터베이스, 디지털콘텐츠 등)에 관한 국내외 이론과 실무에 대한 연구를 촉진하여 지식재산분야의 학문간 융합발전과 국제적 유대를 강화하고, 지식재산에 관한 지식을 보급하여 인적 네트워크 구축과 정책제언을 추진하며 이를 통해 국가발전에 이바지하는 것을 목적으로 한다.