Earticle

초록

영어

The composition of the relationships between Scientists and Employers are formal relationship and informal relationship. The asset nature of these two relationships determines the governance structure of the organization. Based on the theory of the transaction cost and institutionalism, Author develops repeated game models and argues that the governance structure of Little Science should be the combination of non-integration and non-relational contract. Author shows that the governance structure of China’s Little Science is improperly built, which should be rebuilt by de-administrative.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Scientist-employer Relationship, Asset Nature and Governance Structure
 3. Repeated Game Models and Comparative Analysis of Governance Structures
  3.1 Basic Models
  3.2 Comparative Analysis of the Four Governance Structure Forms in a Special Case
 4. Discussion
 5. The Policy Implications for the Little Science in China
 Acknowledgements
 References

키워드

저자

• Zhen-yu Huang [ School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, 150001, China ]
• Yun-long Ding [ School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, 150001, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605