Earticle

초록

영어

Since the Orange-Book-Standard decision(Az. KZR 39/06) was issued on May 6, 2009 by the Federal Court of Justice of Germany(German: Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), a series of recent smartphone-related disputes in many regions and countries have concerned a right holder’s ability to obtain injunctive relief for putative infringer’s infringement of FRAND- encumbered Standard Essential Patents(SEP). There is a decision from the U.S. ITC that if a putative licensee refuses to pay what has been determined to be a FRAND royalty, or refuses to engage in a negotiation to determine FRAND terms, such a refusal could amount to a constructive refusal to negotiate. The Japanese IP High Court similarly issued a decision that an SEP holder can seek injunctive relief against an unwilling licensee though the IP High Court refused to issue a preliminary injunction against Apple in a suit between Samsung and Apple involving SEPs. On the other hand, there are recent decisions from EU Directorate-General for Competition opining that the enforcement of SEP-based injunctive rights could constitute a breach of competition law under certain circumstances in the case of Samsung Electronics and Motorola investigations. In the aftermath of Orange Book Standard, the FRAND defense seemed to be tested successfully in court at least in Germany. But European commission disagreed with that. On March 21, 2013, the District Court of Dusseldorf referred five questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union(“CJEU”) concerning the availability of remedies to the SEP holders. It will be a key point whether CJEU interprets the patent right of standard-essential-patent owner as a proprietary right in the context of traditional patent law or does the enforcement of the right as an abuse of dominant position like a EU commission. Reaching final decision would take time because of the burden which the decision will heavily influence on each court of member states. The point CJEU should contemplate before rendering the final decision is to stick a balance between the unfairness that can cause decrease of incentive to innovation by excluding the injunction right and consequently causing reverse-holdup and the unreasonableness that results in royalty payment for actually invalid patent by forcing the implementer to reserve the right to challenge through unconditional offer.

목차

I. 서론
 II. 표준특허에 관한 특허법과 경쟁법의 긴장관계
  1. 표준특허의 독점배타성
  2. 표준화와 우월적 지위
  3. 표준특허에 대한 유럽 경쟁당국의 동향
 III. 독일법원과 EU위원회의 표준특허에 대한 판단의 대립
  1. 오렌지북 스탠다드 사건과 독일 법원의 판단 동향
  2. EU위원회의 결정
  3. 소결
 IV. 화웨이 v. ZTE 사건에 대한 독일 뒤셀도르프지방법원의 유럽사법재판소(CJEU) 의견 위탁
  1. CJEU에 위탁한 5가지 질문사항
  3. Wathelet 법무관 의견
  4. 검토
 V. 결론
 참고문헌
 

키워드

저자

• 이수진 [ Lee, Soo-Jin | 삼성전자 IP법무팀 수석, 법학박사. ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  산업재산권 [Journal of Industrial Property]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1598-6055

• eISSN

  2733-9483

• 수록기간

  1995~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 367 DDC 346