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표준특허의 Unwilling Licensee와 역홀드업에 관한 연구
A Study on an Unwilling Licensee of Standard Essential Patent and the Resulting Reverse Holdup

첫 페이지 보기
  • 발행기관
    한국지식재산학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    산업재산권 바로가기
  • 통권
    제44호 (2014.08)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.97-134
  • 저자
    이수진
  • 언어
    한국어(KOR)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A255032

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원문정보

초록

영어
A series of recent smartphone-related disputes in many regions and countries concern a right holder’s ability to obtain injunctive relief for putative infringer’s infringement of FRAND-encumbered Standard Essential Patents(SEP). “Patent holdup” becomes an issue when a patent holder seeks an injunction or threatens to enjoin the potential licensee, who has made sunk investments on features relating to the invention embodied in an SEP held by the patentee. “Royalty stacking” also can add to the problem since an end-user product often incorporates features embodied in many different patents and the total amount of royalties that the manufacturer must pay accumulate accordingly. For these reasons, competition authorities have recommended Standard Setting Organizations (SSO) to mandate the inclusion of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”) commitments on the SSO IPR policy in order to avoid undue restraints on competition. SEP holders have typically committed to license their patents on FRAND terms, which is irrevocable. Therefore, SEP holders are obliged to negotiate in good faith with potential licensees who wish to implement the SEP holders’SEPs. The meaning of FRAND, however, is not necessarily clear and defined, and this lack of clarity can be a major obstacle in reaching a license agreement between an SEP holder and a potential licensee. The SEP holder can either seek an injunctive remedy or damages if the negotiation does not result in an agreement. Because of the risk of a holdup, which can restrict a potential licensee’s bargaining power, the competition authorities in many countries have sought to restrain the SEP holder’s right to enforce its SEP. There are recent decisions from EU Directorate-General for Competition and U.S. FTC opining that the enforcement of SEP-based injunctive rights could constitute a breach of competition law under certain circumstances. Furthermore, Federal District Courts in the U.S. ruled that FRAND commitments to the SSOs created enforceable contracts between SEP holders and the SSOs such that the SEP holder is obligated to license its SEP on FRAND terms and the defendant is a third-party beneficiary of these contracts. Thereafter, the U.S. ITC issued that if a putative licensee refuses to pay what has been determined to be a FRAND royalty, or refuses to engage in a negotiation to determine FRAND terms, such a refusal could amount to a constructive refusal to negotiate. Such refusal can also take the form of the putative licensee insisting on terms clearly outside the bounds of what could reasonably be considered to be FRAND terms in an attempt to evade the licensee’s obligation to fairly compensate the patent holder. An ITC exclusion order also could be appropriate if a putative licensee is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court that could award damages. The Japanese IP High Court similarly issued a decision that an SEP holder can seek injunctive relief against an unwilling licensee though the IP High Court refused to issue a preliminary injunction against Apple in a suit between Samsung and Apple involving SEPs. This study is aimed at finding the appropriate scope of the enforcement of the SEP rights. Due to the nature of the IP right that is SEP, limiting SEP right would be necessary in some circumstances, but it is also necessary to consider that patent rights should not be restrained excessively. In other words, arguments favoring the restraint of SEP rights citing patent holdup risks should be balanced and preserve the position of the patentee as guaranteed by the policies underlying the patent protection regime.

목차

I. 서론
 II. 표준화 활동의 변화와 표준특허의 권리행사 제한
 III. 홀드업과 역홀드업
  1. 특허홀드업 문제
  2. 역홀드업(Reverse holdup)문제
 IV. 역홀드업이 문제된 최근 사례
  1. 국제무역위원회(ITC)의 판단
  2. 미국 연방순회항소법원(CAFC)의 판단
  3. 일본 지적재산고등재판소의 판단
  4. 우리나라 공정거래위원회의 판단
 V. 결론
 참고문헌
 

저자

  • 이수진 [ Lee, Soojin | 한양대학교 법학박사. ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국지식재산학회 [Korea Intellectual Property Society]
  • 설립연도
    1967
  • 분야
    사회과학>법학
  • 소개
    본 학회는 지식재산 및 관련 제도(특허, 실용신안, 상표, 디자인, 영업비밀, 저작권, 반도체칩, 컴퓨터프로그램, 데이터베이스, 디지털콘텐츠 등)에 관한 국내외 이론과 실무에 대한 연구를 촉진하여 지식재산분야의 학문간 융합발전과 국제적 유대를 강화하고, 지식재산에 관한 지식을 보급하여 인적 네트워크 구축과 정책제언을 추진하며 이를 통해 국가발전에 이바지하는 것을 목적으로 한다.

간행물

  • 간행물명
    산업재산권 [Journal of Industrial Property]
  • 간기
    연3회
  • ISSN
    1598-6055
  • 수록기간
    1995~2019
  • 등재여부
    KCI 등재
  • 십진분류
    KDC 360 DDC 340

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