Earticle

초록

영어

Under the assumption that ATO (assemble-to-order) supply chain consists of an assembler and two suppliers, who respectively provide one component to the assembler and may form an alliance to negotiate with the assembler, we develop a components replenishment model to study how the ATO supply chain decides components replenishment policies and the suppliers’ alliance policies. The optimal solution of the model is obtained, and the effects of the bargaining power on the optimal solution are theoretically and numerically analyzed. We found that with the enhancement of the bargaining power of the assembler to one supplier, the component selling price and profits of this supplier reduce, and those of another supplier increase. Simultaneously, the expected profit of the assembler increases if its bargaining power is stronger than the other supplier, otherwise, it decreases. If both suppliers’ bargaining powers are stronger than assembler’s, they should bargain with the assembler jointly; if both of their bargaining powers are weaker than the assembler’s, they will bargain with the assembler individually.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. The Model
 3. The Optimal Solution
  3.1. Individual Negotiation
  3.2. Joint Negotiation
 4. Numerical Analysis
 5. Conclusions
 Acknowledgments
 References

키워드

저자

• Li Yuyu [ College of Computer and Information Science, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing, China, 400047 ]
• Huang Bo [ School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China, 400044 ] Corresponding Author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  2005-4246

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605