Earticle

초록

영어

This paper introduces independent finance certification agency to supervise the vendor selection process under the circumstance of the dynamic and incomplete information market. Using the signaling theory under unsymmetric information of game theory, a multidimension signaling model of the strategic choice is established. The game model is set up and the equilibrium calculated out following the description of the key elements of the buyer and vendor in above market. Upon separating equilibrium, the provider dispatches the signal stands for his actual category to maintain the performance of the market. Upon pool equilibrium, the inefficient provider rather than efficient one occupies the core position which results in loss of the latter. Case result shows that the buyer can adopt the signals from the Independent finance certification agency as a significant element when making decision. As a result the introduction of independent finance certification agency can effectively and efficiently supervise the vendor selection process in incomplete information market.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Methodologies and Theory
 3. Equilibrium Analysis
 4. Case Study
 5. Conclusion
 Acknowledgements
 References

키워드

저자

• Luan Chunxiao [ Accounting School, Harbin University of Commerce ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  2005-4246

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605