Earticle

현재 위치 Home

Moral Hazard and State Dependent Utility with Loss Reduction

첫 페이지 보기
  • 발행기관
    한국재무학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    한국재무학회 학술대회 바로가기
  • 통권
    2014년 5개 학회 공동학술연구발표회 (2014.05)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.1991-2012
  • 저자
    Jimin Hong, S. Hun Seog
  • 언어
    영어(ENG)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A243446

※ 기관로그인 시 무료 이용이 가능합니다.

5,800원

원문정보

초록

영어
In this study, we consider a state dependent utility under moral hazard focusing on the loss reduction effort. We assume a two state model: loss occurrence state and no loss occurrence state. According to the marginal utility of income on the states, we analyze the optimal insurance coverage. If the marginal utility of income is equal between the two states, the optimal indemnity and effort level are identical with the state independent utility case. Optimal insurance involves full insurance up to a limit and coinsurance above the limit. If the marginal utility of income in the loss state is larger than that of income in no loss state, then the optimal insurance include full insurance. On the contrary, if the relation is the reverse between the marginal utilities, then the optimal insurance includes the deductible up to a limit and coinsurance above the limit. In this case, full insurance can be also involved. This paper investigates whether the moral hazard is more or less severe under a state dependent utility as well. As a result, if the indemnity level is equal to the indemnity under state independent utility, the effort is higher than that of state independent utility when the marginal utility of income in the loss state is larger than that of the income in no loss state. That is, the moral hazard problem may be less severe. In contrary to this, moral hazard can be more severe when the marginal utility of the income in the loss state is lower than that of the income in no loss state. We apply the state dependent model to the debt contract model. The cost function is state dependent, the interest rate can be lower and the moral hazard problem may not be significant. The reverse case can be also possible depending on the marginal cost.

목차

Abstract
 I. Introduction
 II. Model description
 III. No Moral Hazard Case
 IV. Moral Hazard Case
 V. Extension – Two Period and Moral Hazard Case
 VI. Applications
 VII. Conclusion
 References
 Appendix

저자

  • Jimin Hong [ Business School Seoul National University ]
  • S. Hun Seog [ Business School Seoul National University ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국재무학회 [The Korean Finance Association]
  • 설립연도
    1988
  • 분야
    사회과학>경영학
  • 소개
    본 회는 재무학 및 이와 관련되는 분야를 발전시키며 회원 상호간의 친목 도모를 목적으로 한다.

간행물

  • 간행물명
    한국재무학회 학술대회
  • 간기
    부정기
  • 수록기간
    2006~2024
  • 십진분류
    KDC 325 DDC 330

이 권호 내 다른 논문 / 한국재무학회 학술대회 2014년 5개 학회 공동학술연구발표회

    피인용수 : 0(자료제공 : 네이버학술정보)

    함께 이용한 논문 이 논문을 다운로드한 분들이 이용한 다른 논문입니다.

      페이지 저장