Earticle

초록

영어

This paper investigates whether regulatory forbearance for savings banks in Korea affects the market discipline of depositors using data from 2000 to 2010, which are characterized by a series of exits of savings banks. We find that depositors’ sensitivity to the savings banks’ asset quality decreases when there is regulatory forbearance for failing savings banks. This forbearance effect is also observed in the behavior of the depositors of the neighboring savings banks in the same business area. These results suggest that regulatory forbearance may cause depositors to misjudge bank risks, increasing the expected costs of bank failure.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 2. Regulatory forbearance and market discipline
 3. Savings banks and the regulatory environment in Korea
 4. Data and empirical models
  4.1. Measuring regulatory forbearance
  4.2. Empirical models
 5. Empirical evidence
  5.1. Data and summary statistics
  5.2. Regression results and discussions
 6. Conclusion
 References
 Table

키워드

저자

• Wook Sohn [ KDI School of Public Policy and Management ]
• Hyosoon Choi [ Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330