Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines the determinants and the consequences of congruence between the CEO and other executives focusing on the role of previously-built school and regional ties. Using a sample of 2,129 firm-years from 2003 to 2006 for all firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange, we find that executives are more likely to share the same school or regional background as the CEO when the firm is small, foreign ownership is low, or the CEO is a family member of the controlling shareholder. We also find that such congruence increases firm value when the firm is young and foreign ownership is large, but decreases firm value in firms tightly controlled by family member CEOs through large voting rights. These results suggest that congruence within the top management may facilitate communication when the nature of information being transmitted is “soft”, but may aggravate agency problems when CEOs are entrenched.

목차

Abstract
 I. Related Literature
 II. Hypothesis Development
 III. Data and Sample
  1. Data Source and Sample Construction
  2. Summary Statistics: Concentration of Corporate Executives from Top Schools
 IV. Empirical Findings
  1. Measures of Congruence within the Top Management
  2. Firm Characteristics
  3. Determinants of Abnormal Congruence within the Top Management
  4. The Effect of Abnormal Congruence on Firm Value
 V. Conclusion
 References
 Table

키워드

저자

• Daemin Ahn [ Korea University Business School ]
• Woojin Kim [ Seoul National University Business School ]
• Eun Jung Lee [ Hanyang University ]
• Kyung Suh Park [ Korea University Business School ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330