Earticle

초록

영어

Most principal-agent literature has focused on how to control inefficiency caused by the information asymmetry. This article also addresses the control issue with regard to the compensation structure on how a board of directors as a principal could achieve an effective internal control over the CEO as an agent. Due to the unavol dable information asymmetry on the investment size between the board of directors and the CEO, the CEO is able to exploit the rents and use them as bribe not only to entrench himself but also to exploit more rents in the future. In the game theoretic model , the CEO chooses investment level , the second man decides to launch a palace coup or not, and the board of directors determines the pay gap between the CEO and the second man respectively. In equilibrium, the CEO chooses the optimal (or non optimal) investment for the shareholders when the pay gap between the CEO and the second man is larger (smaller) than that of the exploited rents. To our surprise, the second man’s equilibrium strategy ends up with no oalace coup regardless of whether the pay gap is larger than rents or not. In addition, the more able a CEO is, the larger the pay gap will be. Therefore , in equilibrium the board of directors could contr이 the CEO’s incentive by making the palace coup threat credible with the large pay gap. This article provides a new perspective on the role of the increased pay gap as an outcome of effective internal control, rather than an outcome of internal control failure

목차

요약
 I. 서론
 II. 통제에 관한 문헌 고찰
 III. 내부반란 모형
  1. 지대， 뇌물， 그리고 담합
  2. 모형의 세부 사항
  3. 완전 정보 조건에서 CEO와 이사회의 투자 규모 선택 불일치
 IV. 내부 반란 모델 분석과 내부통제 기제
  1. 지대와 불완전정보의 관계
  2. 불완전정보 조건에서의 균형 상태
  3. 지대, 뇌물, 임금 격차
 V. 숨겨진 CEO의 능력과 임금격차
 VI. 결론
 부록 
 참고문헌
 Abstract

저자

• 송수영 [ Sooyoung Song | 세종대학교 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330