Earticle

초록

영어

Protocols for password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) enable two or more parties communicating over a public network to build a secure communication channel using their easy-to-remember passwords. However, off-line dictionary attacks have always been a major security concern in designing such password-based protocols. Compared with the two-party setting, the concern is significantly increased in the three-party setting where insider attacks may be mounted. In this paper, we identified an inherent flaw in the design of Nam et al.’s three-party PAKE protocol (IEEE Communications Letters, 13(3), 2009) and Lu and Cao’s protocol (Computers & Security, 26(1), 2007) and demonstrated that both protocols are susceptible to a previously unpublished off-line dictionary attack. We hope that by identifying this design flaw, similar structural mistakes can be avoided in future design. We conclude the paper with a simple countermeasure.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. The S-3PAKE+ Protocol
 3. Off-Line Dictionary Attack
 4. Countermeasure and Conclusion
 Acknowledgements
 References

키워드

저자

• Junghyun Nam [ Department of Computer Engineering, Konkuk University ]
• Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo [ School of Computer and Information Science, University of South Australia ]
• Juryon Paik [ Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University ]
• Dongho Won [ Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, ] The corresponding author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605