Earticle

초록

영어

H2-MAC was proposed by Yasuda to increase efficiency over hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) by omitting its outer key, and keep the advantages and security of HMAC at the same time. We propose an efficient method to break H2-MAC, by using a generalized birthday attack to recover the equivalent key, under the assumption that the underlying hash function is secure (collision resistance). We can successfully recover the equivalent key of H2-MAC instantiated with any Merkle-Damgard hash function in about 2n=2 on-line message authentication code (MAC) queries and 2n=2 o-line MAC computations with good probability. We argue that the pseudo random function-ax (PRF-AX) assumption of the origin security proof of H2-MAC, and we prove that the security of H2- MAC is dependent on the collision resistance of the underlying hash function, instead of the PRF assumption.

목차

Abstract
 1 Introduction
 2 Preliminaries
  2.1 Notations
  2.2 Birthday Paradox
  2.3 Brief Description of H2-MAC
 3 Breaking H2-MAC Using Birthday Paradox
 4 Some Optimizations over the attack
  4.1 Enlarging the success probability
  4.2 Implementing more parallelism
 5 The Security Proof of H2-MAC
  5.1 The Re-measurement of PRF-AX
  5.2 The revised Security Proof of H2-MAC
  5.3 H2-MAC is not a Secure MAC
 6 Conclusion
 Acknowledgement
 References

키워드

저자

• Fanbao Liu [ School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology ]
• Tao Xie [ School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology ]
• Changxiang Shen [ School of Computer, Beijing University of Technology ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of Security and Its Applications

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1738-9976

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 등재여부

  SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605