Earticle

초록

영어

This thesis is a study on an embryo has the condition of being human or not. Someone has to be regarded as human being, he/she has a right of living, which is derived from the being a person in the moral sense. We have naturally thought an embryo is human, but today it becomes problematic whether an embryo is a human being or not. This argument has been raised by a rapid developing of biotechnology such as prenatal genetic screening, embryonic reproduction etc. In the biotechnology an embryo is surely not regarded as a human being, but only a living material. It can cause a deep moral injure to think an embryo is not a human being. For human being is a person in the moral sense, and a person has been only thought that can make us live freely. At last we have human dignity, when we live as a person. But the thought that an embryo is not a human being has brought about the possibility of ‘a human being without person’, which is conceived by P. Singer in his Practical Ethics(1991). Further more Singer criticizes a Kant’s view of human dignity as a ‘speciesm’ in the basis of a concept of a human being without person. In this paper I have examined a historical origin of Singer’s concepts, a human being without person firstly and a speciesm especially in comparison with Kant’s view of human dignity nextly. I have also examined that Kant’s concept of autonomy has to be substituted by ‘self-disposability’ in Singer’s bioethical viewpoint, but Singer’s viewpoint is also criticised by Sandel’s ‘ethics of genetic enhancement’ lastly.

목차

Ⅰ. 머리말
 Ⅱ. ‘인격 없는 인간’의 출현
 Ⅲ. 인격과 인간존엄의 법식
 Ⅳ. 인간존엄 대 종차별주의
 Ⅴ. 생명의 신성불가침 대 처분 가능성
 Ⅵ. 맺는말
 참고문헌
 [ABSTRACT]

키워드

저자

• 이을상 [ Lee, Eul-Sang | 부산대학교 인문대학 철학박사 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  의생명과학과 법

• 간기

  반년간

• pISSN

  2092-8599

• eISSN

  2508-5727

• 수록기간

  2009~2025

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 360 DDC 340