Earticle

초록

영어

The paper analyzes a copyright owning firm’s incentive to enforce its copyright in the presence of file-sharing networks. I devise a two-period model where a copyright owner sells two different versions of a creator’s information good, and show that the firm’s overall profits are enhanced by a strategy of differential inter-temporal enforcement of the copyright protection, compared to strategies of no enforcement or full enforcement in both periods. If the firm enforces no copyright protection in the first period, the low-valuation consumers may make and consume copies that are imperfect substitutes for the original information good. If there is a significant increase in the willingness-to-pay of some low-valuation consumers after they experience the information good, the firm can extract the increased consumer surplus by enforcing a positive level of copyright protection in the second period. Social welfare, however, is maximized in the case of no enforcement.

목차

Abstract
 1. The Basic Model
  1.1 Assumptions
  1.2 The Basic Model without File Sharing Netwαks
 2. Demand Reshaping through P2P Networks
  2.1 Full Enforcement of Copyright Protection
  2.2 No Enforcement of Copyright Protection
  2.3 Comparison between Full and No Enforcements
 3. Intertemporal Enforcement Discrimination
  3.1 Intertemporal Discrimination of Copyright Protection Enforcement
  3.2 Comparison between Differential Enforcement and Other Cases
 4. Numerical Examples
 5. Welfare Implications of Copyright Protection Enforcements
 6. Summary and Conclusion
 Reference

키워드

저자

• Jong-woon Kim [ Assistant Secretary to the President for SMEs, Office of the President ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  JITAM [Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management]

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1598-6284

• eISSN

  2508-1209

• 수록기간

  1999~2026

• 십진분류

  KDC 005 DDC 005