This article aims to provide an understanding of the dynamics of pension politics in South Korea with special attention to the role of bureaucrats. In order to explain both reforms, this research will closely examine how the expertise and the legitimacy of civil servants together with the institutional positioning of bureaucrats have affected their power and role in the policy-making process. This article will argue that bureaucrats, particularly the welfare bureaucracy, attained their major reform goals by associating as well as competing with other political actors in two major reforms.
목차
Abstract Bipolar Pension Reforms: Dynamics of Pension Politics Why bureaucrats in pension reforms? Expertise, legitimacy, and institutional positioning Development of the National Pension Scheme: Pension reforms in Korea before 2007 Pension reform process 2007: Securing institutions First Try: Activities of the Development Committee of the National Pension and building pension reform models Second try: Policy coalitions among parties in the National Assembly A revisit to the role of bureaucrats: Emerging ‘push and pull effect’? References
키워드
pension politicsbureaucracypolicymakingSouth Korea