Earticle

초록

영어

This study analyzes the philosophical aporia which was exposed during the debates that developed amongst Neo-Confucianists during the Choson era, whose positions were based on the philosophical theory of the Zhu Xi School of Thought. Of these various debates, the present study focuses on the discussion amongst the four scholars on the topic of 5 adan eh'ilehiing ([lj flffij-t'tfi, four beginnings and seven emotions )-which includes the debate over the notion of insim tosim (J\A;'i~>L.', human mind and moral mind)-and the arguments over 1m Songju's theory ofyugiron (PfE~~~, ki-holistic Cosmology).
The debates between Yi Hwang, whose penname was T'oegye, and 1(1 Taesung, whose penname was Kobong, saw Yi Hwang establish a moral theory while 1(1 Taesung argued about the structural facts around the functions of the heart or mind (JL.', sim). To this end, Yi Hwang introduced a moral argument, or axiological statement, in the form of the theory of saeh'il hobal ([lj-t1L~~~, the mutual arising of the four beginnings and seven emotions), a theory which was in turn based on notions such as those of sad an ibal ([ljilffij=:EI~~, the four beginnings arise from principle (It)) and eh'ilchong kibal (-t'tfi=~~~, the seven emotions arise from material force [kz]). On the other hand, Ki Taesung opposed Yi's theory, arguing that Yi's dualistic presentation could lead to further misunderstanding.
For his part, Yi Yi, whose pen name was Yulgok, inherited I(1's perspective in his own debates with Song Hon (penname Ugye). In this regard, Yi Yi argued that Yi Hwang's theory of saeh'il hobal was wrong in that while the seven emotions (eh'ilehoniJ represented the totality of human emotions, the four beginnings (sad an) were special emotions that nevertheless fell under the category of human emotions. On the other hand, Yi Yi asserted that the human mind (insim) and moral mind (tosim) were in fact interconnected, and could be mutually interchanged with one another (~~i1, ehongsz).
However, the theory of the mutual interchange between insim-tosim (~~i1~, ehongsiron) presented as a counter-argument to the theory of the mutual arising of the four beginnings and seven emotions (saeh'il hoba~ can be likened to a value-based argumentation, or moral argumentation. This was certainly contradictory, and also represented a case of philosophical aporia. This situation originated from the fact that Zhu Xi's Thought was perceived as a thought based on natural law formed in the medieval period without a proper division of values and facts.
In his discussions about the role of human nature (inmulsoni) in Zhu Xi's cosmological theory of Ii-qi (Il.j~U~, principle and material force),l 1m Songju whose penname was Nongmun, emphasized the fact that Zhu Xi's notion of Ijyi fenshu (~~7t7*, universality and particularity) was representative of the universality and particularity that existed in all the myriad of things found in the cosmos. 1m possessed a perspective of cosmology (nature) which regarded the universe as being filled with ki (holistic ki of the cosmos). 1m believed that while the ki (material force) of the universe moves naturally by itself, the power of life (j:~, saenguz), or what could also be referred to as the vitality of life (j:ifp't1, saengmyongsoni), was involved within ki itself. As a result, 1m believed that Zhu Xi's notion of Ii (11., principle) was in effect unnecessary. Meanwhile, based on the original condition of material force or energy, 1m identified ki (material force) as the clearness of original ki (v!~¥flJm:, tamil ch'ongho). However, as ki is not static, what we are in fact seeing is the clearness vs. unclearness of ki (¥flJ1J.jn,~, ch'ongt'ak subak). Therefore, the original condition of ki can be perceived as little more than a form of philosophical demand. Furthermore, 1m argued that i'i/ punsu (Il.~7t7*, one principle and its manifoldness) was the same as ki'il punsu (~--7t7*, one energy and different shapes), and that as such the possibility could not be ruled out that Zhu Xi's Ijyi fenshu (Il.~7t7*) was in fact based on the premise of qjyi fenshu (~~7t7*). As the concept of Ii (11.) indicates principle and ki (~) originally indicates material force, i'il punsu (Il.--7t7*, one principle and its manifoldness), which under the religious-philosophy of the medieval period meant sharing in the divine, is more correctly perceived as Ii. However, as a close relationship exists between Ii and ki within the metaphysical category, one cannot fully deny the veracity of the notion of ki'il punsu (~~-7t7*, one energy different shapes).
This is the philosophical aporia of Zhu Xi's li-qi theory that served as the religious
philosophy (metaphysics) of the Medieval Era.

목차

Absrtact
 INTRODUCTION
 1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL APORIA OF THE "FOURSEVENDEBATES" AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM
  The theme and main actors involved in the debates
  Issues arising from the debate between Yi Hwang and Ki Taesung
  Issues arising from the debate between Yi Yi and Song Hon
 2. PHILOSOPHICAL APORIA OF YUGIRON(唯氣論)
  Ki's power of life(氣)
  Ki'il punsu(氣一分殊)
 CONCLUSION
 REFERENCES

키워드

저자

• DONG HEE LEE [ a professor in the Department of Ethics, Keimyung U niversiry ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  Acta Koreana

• 간기

  반년간

• pISSN

  1520-7412

• 수록기간

  1998~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS,A&,HCI

• 십진분류

  KDC 912 DDC 951