Earticle

Abstract

영어

The injunction is a significant relief for patent holders. However, if a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder apply for an injunction, it may prevent potential competitors from entering into the related market and constitutes abuse of market dominant position. In Huawei v. ZTE case, the CJEU set a rule of “five steps” to judge the justification of the SEP holders’ injunction application. This issue refers to not only the interests between SEP holders and users, but also the aim of innovation incentive and the aim of free competition protection. To better balance the two significant legislative intentions namely ‘innovation incentive’ and‘competition freedom’and further improve the social and economic development, there are more elements need to be concerned: (1)As for market dominant position judgment, SEP holders should not be directly assumed as a market dominator, following elements need to be concerned: the competition situation among different standards, the market share of SEP, whether the standard is a mandatory one, the competition between standard products and non-standard products, the technology transfer costs.(2) As for abuse behavior judgment, the ‘five step’ is not enough. The identity of SEP holders, the time of the injunction application, the good faith of SEP users, whether the SEP holders charges for an unreasonably high royalty, these factors also need to be examined. (3)As for the assessment of validity of injunction application, the principle of weighing advantages and disadvantages needs to be established. The court should uphold the injunction application if the advantages outweigh disadvantages, otherwise the injunction should not be granted.

중국어

禁令救济是专利权人的一项重要的救济途径。 然而, 标准必要专利权人在申请禁令 救济的过程中可能会造成阻碍潜在的竞争者进入相关市场的情况, 进而构成滥用市场 支配地位的垄断行为。 在华为诉中兴一案中, 欧盟法院确立了一套“五步骤检验法”的规 则来验证标准必要专利权人申请禁令救济的合法性问题。 该问题不仅涉及到标准必要 专利权人与专利使用者之间的利益, 更涉及到对创新的激励和对自由竞争的保护这两 个立法目的的实现。 为了更好的平衡“鼓励创新”和“促进竞争”这两个重要的立法目标,以 促进整体社会与经济的发展, 需要在确定标准必要专利权人禁令救济行为是否合法的 问题方面考量更多因素：(1)就市场支配地位认定而言, 不应将标准必要专利权人直接 认定为必然具有市场支配地位, 而应综合考虑不同标准之间的竞争状况、 标准必要专利 人的市场份额、 该标准是否为强制标准、 标准产品与非标准产品间的竞争状况、 技术转 移成本等因素来确认标准必要专利权人是否具有市场支配地位；(2)就滥用行为认定的 因素而言, 不应仅考虑“程序性步骤”, 还需考虑标准必要专利权人的身份、 禁令申请的时 间、 使用者的善意状态、 权利人是否过高定价等因素。 (3)就禁令救济行为是否合法的评 估方式而言, 应确立利弊权衡的原则, 即当标准必要专利权人禁令救济行为“利”与“弊” 兼具时, 利大于弊时予以支持, 弊大于利时不予支持。

Contents

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Standardization, SEP, injunction and competition law
Ⅲ. The influence of SEP injunction to the competition
Ⅳ. FRAND: an obstruct for injunction application?
Ⅴ. Huawei v. ZTE and relevant cases : seeking for a balance between Innovation and Competition
Ⅵ. New elements to balance the multiple interests
Ⅶ. Conclusion
References
<中文摘要>

Authors

• Geng Bang [ 경방 | Queen Mary University of London, LLM student. ]
• Lu Mingyu [ 려명유 | law professor in Zhengzhou University, PhD supervisor, distinguished professor of Henan province, scholar in National intellectual property training base, research area: economic law, competition law, IP law. ]

Reference