Earticle

Abstract

영어

Hostile M&As take place without the consent of a target company's management team. Therefore it is quite natural that the management tries to come up with ideas to defend against the
M&A once they perceive any sign of it. Though the management can take measures of defending against the takeover under the current corporate law, there is question how arbitrarily they can take the measures. Given the fact that the team of the management has a wide range of managerial discretion, it is considered that they can freely take measures of defending against the M&A. On the other hand, taking the defending measures without considering share
holders' opinions is the breach of fiduciary duty, which is problematic since the management team has a status of a mandatory entrusted with full management by the company.
In the case of successful hostile M&A, replacement of the target company's management with the bidder's management can be expected. For this reason, we can't deny that the management can consider the measures to protect their interests in the company instead of defending those of share holders and the company. In this regard, the defending measures can potentially damage the share holders and the company. As a result, allowing the management to take the defending measures without the consent of the share holders can be a problem from the viewpoint of protecting the interests of share holders and the company. What is the point of investigating legal regulations regarding defending measures against the takeover is how to avoid potential damage by the management when they use the defending measures to protect themselves.

Contents

I. 들어가며
 II. 주주보호의 관점에서 본 매수방어대책의 문제점
 III. 일본에 있어서의 기업매수방어대책에 관한 법규제
 IV. 기업가치보고서 및 매수방어대책에 관한 지침
 V. 결론
 참고문헌
 Abstract

Authors

• 양만식 [ Yang Man Sig | 단국대학교 법과대학 법학과 조교수, 법학박사 ]

Reference