Earticle

이 글은 니체와 하이데거의 니힐리즘의 극복에 있는 존재사유에서 실존의 의미를 탐구한다. 이 목적에서 논자는 위버멘쉬(Übermensch)를 중심으로 니체와 하이데거를 교차 분석하고 각자 의 ‘존재의 의미’를 밝히면서 존재자 물음을 극복한 하이데거의 존재물음을 해명한다. 니체는 니힐리즘을 역사적 운동으로 간주하고 가치사상에 입각해 해명한다. 종래의 가치가 무가치해진 허무한 감정에 직면하여 니체는 삶에 새로운 가치를 요청한다. 그리고 니힐리즘의 한 가운데로 뛰어든다. 니체는 새로운 가치 정립자로서 인간존재를 상정하기 위해 전통의 일체 를 거절하고 인간존재의 모든 것이 세계 자체가 되어야 한다고 주장한다. 즉 니체는 인간존재가 ‘위버멘쉬’로서 존재할 수 있어야 한다고 생각한다. ‘위버멘쉬’를 추구한 니체는 끊임없는 자기극 복의 의지를 의욕한다. 니체에게서 자기극복의 의지가 삶의 본질이다. 그러나 하이데거는 니체를 전형적인 니힐리즘으로 간주한다. 니체가 제시한 가치는 근본적으 로 형이상학적인 가치의 극한적인 재현이다. 그러나 하이데거는 니체가 형이상학의 원리에 휘말 려있지만, ‘위버멘쉬’는 실존의 진리에 최초로 진입한 존재라고 이중적으로 평가한다. 우리는 니 체와 하이데거를 추적함에 있어서 이러한 이중적 평가를 간과해서는 안 된다. 그럼에도 불구하 고, 하이데거의 기본적인 논조는 니체가 ‘힘에의 의지’와 ‘위버멘쉬’의 연관성을 본질적으로 사유 하지 못했다고 주장한다. 하이데거에게서 그 연관성의 물음은 존재 자체이다. 따라서 하이데거 는 니체가 간과했던 존재의 본질적인 의미를 묻고, 존재의 자체의 현성을 위해 ‘무’와 연관지어 탐구한다.

This thesis is to examine the meaning of existence in Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought of Being for the overcoming of Nihilism. In this purpose, I am going to take a thing apart Nietzsche's Übermensch and Heidegger's Dasein in turn. But I don't mean to put Heidegger's interpretation to Nietzsche’s thought of Being on the main end of my study. I am going to clear each of their thinking's the meaning of Being and elucidate Heidegger's the distinct question of Being which is overcoming the question of beings. Nietzsche and Heidegger inquire about the question of the meaning of Being distinct from a traditional metaphysics. Nietzsche thinks of 'Nihilism' as the historical movement and lay it down on the idea of value. He demands a new value for life up against a feeling of nothingness that the best value is worthless. Nietzsche denies a entire metaphysical tradition and claims that the whole of man have to become the world itself in order to set themselves as a builder of value. Because he thinks that all man must become Übermensch, that is, the answer for overcoming Nihilism. Nietzsche seeking Übermensch desires self-conquest through Will to power and that is the essence of his life. Heidegger considers Nietzsche's thought of Being as a typical nihilism. Because in Heidegger's view, the new values for human life made by Nietzsche are the radical re-presentation of a metaphysical value. Heidegger evaluates his idea about Being dually-in order words Nietzsche's Übermensch is the beings who enter primally into the truth of existence, although he was involved in the metaphysics's principle of beings; even so, Heidegger's the basic tone of argument takes that Nietzsche couldn't think the essential relation of 'Will to power' to 'Übermensch', the truth of Being itself. Heidegger, thus, asks about the fundamental meaning of Being for ‘an-wesen’

This paper aims to investigate the Nietzsche’s Philosophy in Edward Albee Of Seascape. Albee displays his characters who suffer and live in an absurd world, but he makes them eventually realize the possibility for maturation and change. Albee’s characters stand naked, stripped of illusions. Once naked, they are to stand on the brink of transformation through existential experience. Albee always focuses on the possibility that his characters, in the process of becoming, can overcome their destiny. In Seascape, Albee dramatizes the existential growth of humankind, coping with the human finitude. His characters confront the moment of change and they embody existential awakening to overcome life’s trials. Nietzsche explains the two types of nihilism. One of them is that man believes life is meaningless. The other is that the time of crisis serves as an opportunity to face up to life. Albee explores both what a man ought to be and how a man should treat the rest of life. Charlie and Sarah suffer from the extreme pain of death and the harsh reality. But They eventually realize facing death has the potential for improving the quality of life. Albee does not write merely about the naturalistic evolution of the human species. Rather, he deals with a kind of spiritual evolution of self-awareness(overcoming).

이 글은 2013년 10월 31일 순천대학교 지리산권문화연구원에서 주관한 시민 인문학 강좌에서 발표한 것을 발 전시킨 것이다. 이 글의 주제는 “The kingdom of God is now or never” 이다. 지금 이 순간 하느님의 왕국을 보지 못한다면 앞으로도 절대 하느님의 왕국을 만날 수 없다니체에 따르면 인간은 지금 이 순간에 행복하지 못하면 결코 행복해질 수 없다. 바로 지금 그리고 이곳의 삶, 그리고 이 속에서 이루어지는 우리의 선택은 영원히 반복된다고 생각해야 한다. 이 논리에 따라 만약 지금 자신의 삶이 행복하지 않다면, 이 행복하지 않은 삶이 어떤 주기를 가지고 영원히 반복된다는 것이다.

This essay has been developed from the draft of my speech at the Humanities Lecture for Citizens organized by the Research Institute of Jirisan Culture at the Sunchon National University on October 31, 2013. Its main topic is that the kingdom of God is now or never. It is totally impossible to enter into the kingdom of God unless we have a chance to experience it at this very moment. According to Nietzsche's idea, a man will never be happy if he is not happy at this very moment because his life right here and right now is eternally recurrent. In this context, I raise a question over why people are trying to endure present pain to get happiness in the future. And I give an explanation of how we can overcome nihilism from the viewpoint of Nietzsche's concept of the eternal recurrence.

This paper discussed some elements of German philosopher Nietzsche’s thoughts found in the works of modern Korean poet Yu Chi-hwan. In his essays, Yu Chi-hwan mentioned Nietzsche’s famous declaration ‘God is dead’ two times. This is external evidence which Yu Chi-hwan read Nietzsche. Internal evidences are as follows: (1) critique of Christianity, (2) duality of Nihilism, (3) the life and the will, (4) eternal return, The Earth. (1) and (2) are considerably concrete in his works, but (3) and (4) found in his poems only. In modern Korean literature Yu Chi-wan is only poet who discussed Nihilism. Therefore we can evaluate him a largely recipient poet of Nietzsche. Yu Chi-hwan is one of thinker-poets in Korea. His literature can be elucidated from the point of view on the reception of Nietzsche’s thoughts.

이글의 주된 목적은 로티의 원리 없는 윤리학을 듀이의 자연주의적 관점에서 비판적으로 검토하는 것이다. 로티는 상상력에 기초한 듀이의 윤리학을 전반적으로 받아들이면서도 체계화의 가능성을 갖는 지성 개념은 의도적으로 거부한다. 그러나 극단적인 우연성을 주장하는 해체의 철학관 위에서 로티는 윤리적 허무주의에의 우려를 불러온다. 왜냐하면 로티는 도덕성 또한 공통의 토대가 없는 감정적 연대에 의해서 지지되어야 한다고 믿기 때문이다. 이 논문은 지적이고, 민주적이고, 미적인 것을 포함하는 듀이의 경험 개념을 해명함으로써 보편성에 의존하지 않고도 허무주의로 귀결되지 않는 방식이 있다고 제안한다. 그것은 듀이의 철학에서 경험의 일반적 특성들이 경험의 공공성을 함축한다는 것을 의미한다. 듀이에게 경험은 공공성을 갖는다. 왜냐하면 경험을 구성하는 유기체로서의 인간이 신체적/물리적 층위의 경험을 공유하기 때문이다. 그러므로 듀이의 윤리학은 상황이나 맥락을 고려하면서도 주관주의에 이르지 않는다. 또한 그것은 꼭짓점은 없지만 환경과의 조화를 지향하는 ‘성장’을 도덕적 목적으로 제안함으로써, 도덕적 다원주의에 대한 적절한 해명의 가능성을 열어 줄 것이다.

The main purpose of this paper is to critically examine Rorty's conception of 'ethics without principles' in terms of Dewey's naturalistic views. While Rorty claims to accept Dewey's ethical view based on imagination, he intentionally rejects Dewey's core concept of intelligence, which, according to Rorty, may lead to a systematization of moral theory. However, following Derridian deconstruction, Rorty insists on extreme contingency, which gives rise to a fear of moral nihilism, for the conception of morality supported only by emotional solidarity may loose any form of common ground. In this paper, I will suggest that Dewey's comprehensive conception of experience involving the intellectual, the democratic, and the esthetic does not have recourse to any notion of universality, while avoiding nihilism. Dewey presupposes "the genetic traits of experience," which work as a common ground for varied human experience, which in experientialist terms are rendered as a shared ground for extended experience. Therefore, Dewey's ethics is not subject to subjectivism, even if it claims that human conducts depend on situations or contexts. Although Dewey suggests "growth" as the main aim of human life, the aim does not postulate any converging apex. Dewey's open-ended conception of growth as the aim of moral life will give a more appropriate account of pluralistic view of morality, without falling into a nihilistic relativism.

서평

A book review

This paper aims to examine the aesthetics of acceptance in Hemingway’s earlier works. Participating in the war as young persons, earlier protagonists experience the horrendous calamity there. They are faced with death or wounded in the battle field, and feel the afraid of death. After their back-to-society, they suffer from aftereffects caused by war. Krebs in “Soldier’s Home” falls in helplessness and Nick Adams in Hemingway’s earlier short stories has a hard time with shell shock such as insomnia. The consequence is that they got lost in the world of nihilism. Nevertheless, they read books, go fishing and watch the bull-fighting to treat sleeplessness and purify their body and mind, rather than remain in the social mood of nihilism. Especially, Jake in The Sun Also Rises can dignify himself by the manner in which he accepts the inescapable catastrophe. Jake’s graceful acceptance flourishes in protagonists of Hemingway’s later novels who devote themselves to actualizing justice. As a result, this study shows that Hemingway’s earlier works reveal the aesthetic of acceptance, getting over nihilism which was widespread in 1920’s after World War I.

니힐리즘은 무에 대한 인간의 사색이다. 무는 존재자가 아니고 따라서 경험의 한계를 넘어서 있기에, 무에 대해서는 검증, 반증이 가능한 판단이 아니라 오로지 전망적 의견 내지 입장만이 세워질 수 있다. 이 입장들이 ‘무란 무엇인가?’라는 물음에 대한 인간의 답들로서의 니힐리즘들이다. 어떤 이들은 이 물음에 ‘존재’라 답하고 어떤 이들은 ‘아무것도 아닌 것’이라 답한다. 이 답들은 존재자의 타자로서의 무에 대한 것이기에, 여기에는 부정적인 방식으로 무의 타자로서의 인간적 존재자의 자기 이해도 포함된다. 무가 ‘존재’라면, 무가 아닌 존재자는 ‘아무것도 아닌 것’이고 따라서 인간의 ‘삶은 부정’된다. 무가 ‘아무것도 아닌 것’이라면, 오히려 존재자가 ‘참된 실재’이고 따라서 인간의 ‘삶은 긍정’된다. 전자는 존재와 무의 동일성에서 출발하는 전통적 형이상학, ‘존재론적 니힐리즘’이고, 후자는 존재자와 생성에 대한 긍정에서 출발하는 니체의 ‘완전한 니힐리즘’이다. 두 니힐리즘은 정면으로 충돌한다. 전자는 ‘무로서의 존재의 긍정’과 ‘삶의 부정’으로, 후자는 ‘무의 타자로서의 존재자의 긍정’과 ‘삶의 긍정’으로 일관하기 때문이다. 따라서 니힐리즘은 이 두 입장 중 하나를 지칭하는 이름이 아니라, 무에 대한 이 상충된 의견들, 입장과 반대 입장 간의 무한한 갈등을 의미한다. 본고는 이 갈등이 결코 ‘끝’에 이를 수 없음을 논증한다. 존재자의 근거로서의 존재와 무를 추구하는 인간의 형이상학적 충동은 고갈되지 않기에, 존재론적 니힐리즘의 헛됨과 공허가 백일하에 드러난 후에도 이 니힐리즘은 영원히 되돌아온다. 따라서 영원히 회귀하는 존재론적 니힐리즘을 반복해서 끝내야 하는 완전한 니힐리즘 역시 자신의 끝에 도달할 수 없다. 니힐리즘의 역사에는 끝이 있을 수 없다. 즉 서로에 반하는(para) 두 의견(doxa)으로서의 니힐리즘들 간의 역설적(para–dox) 항쟁은 끝내 ‘끝’나지 않는다.

Der Nihilismus ist die Überlegung des Menschen über das Nichts. Da das Nichts kein Seiendes ist und daher über die Grenze der Erfahrung grundsätzlich übersteigt, kann im Bezug auf das Nichts weder verifizierbares noch falsifizierbares Urteil (logos apophantikos), sondern nur die perspektivische Position gesetzt werden. Eben diese Positionen (die Position und die Gegenposition) als die menschlichen Beantwortungen auf die Frage, „Was ist das Nichts?“ sind die Nihilismen. Dieser Frage wird einerseits die Antwort: „das Sein“ gegeben, andererseits die: „nichts“. In diesen Antworten als in den Positionen über das Andere des Seienden wird in negativer Weise auch das Selbstverständnis des Menschen als des Anderen des Nichts eingeschlossen. Ist das Nichts das Sein, so soll das Seiende, das nicht das Sein ist, nichts sein und daher sein Leben verneient werden. Ist das Nichts hingegen nichts, so soll eher das Seiende ein ens realissimum sein und daher sein Leben bejaht werden. Die erstere Antwort ist die traditionelle Metaphysik, der ontologische Nihilismus, der von der Identität vom Sein und Nichts ausgeht, die letztere der Nietzschesche vollkommene Nihilismus, der von dem Jasagen des Seienden und dessen Werdens ausgeht. Beide Nihilismen laufen einander zuwider, denn der erstere behauptet die Bejahung des Seins als des Nichts somit die Verneinung des Lebens des Seienden und der letztere die Bejahung des Seienden somit dessen Lebens. Der Nihilismus ist also kein Name nur für einen der beide, sondern ein „Kampfplatz der endlosen Streitigkeiten“ (Kant) der beiden Antworten als Positionen über das Nichts. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht aufzuzeigen, dass dieser Kampf nie zu Ende kommen kann. Da der metaphysische Hang des weisheitsliebenden Seienden, das Sein und das Nichts als seinen Grund zu suchen, nie ausgeschöpft wird, wird der ontologische Nihilismus, nachdem seine Leere und Unhaltbarkeit bewiesen werden, ewig wiederkommen. So kann auch der vollkommene Nihilismus, der darin besteht, den ontologischen Nihilismus zu Ende zu bringen, nie zu seinem Ende kommen, weil er den ewig wiederkehrenden ontologischen Nihilismus sich wiederholend zu Ende zu bringen suchen muss. Es gibt also in der Geschichte des Nihilismus letzten Endes kein Ende. Einem Nihilismus läuft ein anderer zuwider, dem der erstere ebenso zuwiderläuft, um weiter den Zuwiderlauf des letzteren herbeizuführen usw. Der Nihilismus als para-doxe Antithetik von beiden einander widersprechenden (para) Meinungen (doxa) kommt nie zu Ende.

니체의 허무주의 주창 이후 많은 문학, 드라마, 영화에서 허무주의와 연관한 인간 심리에 대한 묘사가 이루어 졌으며, 애니메이션 또한 허무주의를 담아낸 서사가 TV 시리즈와 극장용 애니메이션으로 제작되고 있다. 특히, 애니 메이션은 여타 매체와 달리 어떠한 상상의 이미지도 구현할 수 있는 시각 영상매체로써 실사 촬영 영상과 다른 특성 을 보이며, 시간적 속성을 가짐으로써 만화와 차별된다. 이에 본 연구는 니체가 정의한 허무주의의 세 단계가 어떻게 애니메이션 캐릭터에서 재현되고, 어떠한 상황을 연출하는지 애니메이션 <진격의 거인>을 사례로 분석하고자 한다. 이를 위한 연구의 전개는 첫째, 니체의 허무주의의 유형과 세 단계에 대해 문헌을 중심으로 고찰하고, 대중매체에 재 현된 허무주의와 애니메이션의 특성에 대해 살펴본다. 둘째, 문헌연구에 기초하여 사례분석 대상의 서사와 구축된 세 계관을 통해 허무주의적 관점에서 해석하며, 수동적 허무주의, 능동적 허무주의, 영원회귀의 삶의 세 단계 허무주의를 통해 네 명의 주요 등장인물을 분석한다. 그 결과 해당 애니메이션은 자신의 삶과 존재의 의미를 향한 부정과 긍정이 라는 두 가지 메시지를 전달하며, 이를 통해 관객들은 인간의 실존에 대해 심도 있게 고찰할 기회를 맞이한다. 본 연 구는 니체의 허무주의가 대중오락 매체인 애니메이션에서 어떻게 재현되는지 살펴볼 수 있는 연구라 사료된다.

After Friedrich Nietzsche's advocacy of nihilism, many literary works, dramas, and films have depicted aspects of human psychology associated with nihilism. Animation, too, has been used to convey nihilism, with narratives infused with nihilistic themes produced as both TV series and theatrical animations. Particularly, animation, as a visual medium capable of realizing any imaginative image unlike other media, possesses distinctive characteristics from live-action cinematography and differs from comics in its temporal properties. Hence, this study aims to analyze how Nietzsche's defined three stages of nihilism are represented within animation characters and how they construct various scenarios, using the anime "Attack on Titan" as a case study. The research unfolds by first examining Nietzsche's types of nihilism and the three stages through a review of literature, while also investigating the portrayal of nihilism in mass media and considering the unique attributes of animation. Secondly, building upon the literature review, the analysis interprets the narrative and constructed world of the chosen case study from a nihilistic perspective, examining four major characters through the stages of passive nihilism, active nihilism, and eternal recurrence. The findings demonstrate that the anime conveys two messages regarding negation and affirmation of one's life and existence, thereby offering viewers an opportunity to deeply contemplate human existence. This study is considered significant as it examines how Nietzschean nihilism is portrayed within the popular entertainment medium of animation.

학상담이 고유한 입지를 다지려면 기존의 상담과 다른 방법론을 제시하는 일이 중요하다. 그러나 이것만으로는 사람들을 철학상담으로 이끌기 힘들다. 사람들은 자신의 문제가 정신과나 심리상담에서가 아니라 철학상담에서 다루기에 적합하다고 생각할 때 철학상담사를 찾을 것이다. 필자는 이 논문에서 ‘피상적 피로’가 아니라 ‘실존적 피로’가 철학상담에 적합한 대상이라고 주장할 것이다. 이 주장을 입증하기 위해 필자는 다음과 같은 네 가지 작업을 수행할 것이다. 첫째, 현대사회를 ‘피로사회’로 규정하는 한병철의 주장이 비판적으로 검토될 것이다. 둘째, 개인이 자신의 고유한 존재인 실존에 대한 의미나 가치를 느끼지 못하고 또한 그것을 실현할 가능성도 발견하지 못한 채 지친 상태가 ‘실존적 피로’로 규정될 것이다. 셋째, 필자는 ‘실존적 피로 증후군’을 허무주의의 맥락에서 탐구함으로써 실존적 피로의 시대적 배경과 존재론적 근원을 밝힐 것이다. 끝으로 필자는 실존적 ‘불안’이 아니라 실존적 ‘피로’를 철학상담의 대상으로 삼아야 하는 이유와 그로 인한 강점에 대해 간략히 언급할 것이다.

In order for philosophical counseling to establish a unique position, it is important to present a methodology different from the existing counseling. However, it is difficult to lead people to philosophical counseling with this alone. People will go to a philosophical counselor when they think their problems are suitable to be dealt with in philosophical counseling rather than in psychiatry or psychological counseling. In this thesis, I will argue that 'existential fatigue' rather than 'superficial fatigue' is a suitable subject for philosophical counseling. To prove this claim, I will do four things: First, Han Byung-Ceol's argument that defines modern society as a 'fatigue society' is critically reviewed. Second, I will define 'existential fatigue' as an exhausted state in which an individual does not feel the meaning or value of existence, which is his or her own existence, and does not discover the possibility of realizing it. Third, I will reveal the historical background and ontological source of existential fatigue by exploring 'existential fatigue syndrome' in the context of nihilism. Finally, I will briefly mention the reason why existential 'fatigue', not existential 'anxiety', should be the subject of philosophical counseling and the resulting strengths.

본 연구는 일제하 국제 식민도시로서의 상하이 지역의 특수성을 고찰하고, 1920~30년대 한・일 작가들의 상하이 체험에 대해 살펴보았다. 더불어김광주, 요코미쓰 리이치의 ‘상하이’ 관련 소설을 통해 상하이 인식의 특성과 차별성을 살펴보았다. 난징조약 후 개항과 더불어 상하이는 국제도시로서 급부상하였지만 그것은 식민화된 국제도시의 성격을 지닌 것이었다. 영국・미국・프랑스의 조계지 등이 들어선 상하이는 급속히 동양 제일의 식민자본주의 대도시로 부각되었으며 서구의 향락적・소비적 문화와 문물이 침투해 들어왔다. 20세기 초반의 상하이는 중국의 경제・무역・금융・문화의 중심이었고, 세계 각국의탐험가・실업가・정치가・문화인・실직자들이 몰려들었던 코스모폴리탄이었다. 또한 마르크시즘과 아나키즘이 사상적 본류를 형성했던 혁명사상의본거지이기도 했다. 신채호・안창호・이광수・주요한 등 국권 상실기의 조선의 문학인들과 정치인들은 상하이를 국권 회복과 근대문물 수용의 장으로 인식하였다. 한편, 이러한 국제도시로서의 상하이는 도쿄와 대비되면서 20세기 초 일본 작가들에게 동경의 대상이 되었던 곳이다. 나가이 가후를 비롯하여, 다니자키 준이치로, 아쿠타가와 류노스케 등은 상하이를 방문하고 그 체험을 기록하기도하였다. 이들 일본 문인들의 상하이 인식은 다양한 동아시아 인식을 보여주지만, 근본적으로는 조선 문인들의 상하이 인식과 다른 맥락에 놓여 있다. 1920년대 후반~30년대 중반의 상하이를 경험한 김광주와 요코미쓰 리이치는 한국과 일본에서 ‘모더니즘’ 계열에 속하는 작가로 모던 상하이의 감각을 문학적으로 형상화한 작가들이다. 이들 두 작가가 그리고 있는 ‘상하이’는 국제도시의 화려함, 퇴폐・분주함・자본주의・탐욕・아편・매춘 등을담고 있지만, 두 작가의 감각은 ‘환멸과 허무’로 모아진다는 데 공통점이 있다. 김광주는 만주・상하이로 건너온 조선의 애국지사들이 그들의 포부와달리 타락한 생활을 하는 실상을 파헤치고 이를 통해 이념의 허무에 도달한작가다. 요코미쓰 리이치 또한 5・30사건을 중심으로 일본 제국주의자의 실상을 체험하고 ‘아시아주의’와 일본 군국주의에 회의와 허무・환멸을 보여주고 있는 작가다. 이들의 소설은 제국과 식민이라는 커다란 간극을 지니고있으나 상이한 체험과 절망을 통해 ‘허무’라는 공통된 지점을 보여준다.

This essay studied on the peculiarities of the Shanghai as an international colonial city and examined the Shanghai experience of Korean and Japanese writers in the 1920s and 30s. In addition, I tried to research Kim Kwangju and Yokomitsu Reich’s “Shanghai” and characteristics and distinctiveness which represented in their novels. With the opening of the port, Shanghai quickly emerged as an international city, but it was a colonial international city. With the leased territory of British, the United States, and France, Shanghai quickly became the largest colonial capitalist metropolis in the East, penetrating into the western consumer culture. In the early 20th century, Shanghai was a China’s economic, trade, financial, and cultural center. And Marxism and anarchism were risen also in Shanghai. Joseon politicians and literary scholars including Shin Chaeho, Ahn Changho, Lee Kwangsoo regarded Shanghai as a place of restoration of national rights and acceptance of modern artifacts. On the other hand, Shanghai as an international city has become a subject of longing for Japanese writers in the early 20th century. Nagai Kafu, Tanizaki, Akudakawa and Ryosuke also visited Shanghai and recorded their experiences. Kim Kwangju and Yokomitsu Reich who experienced Shanghai in the mid-20s and mid-30s are writers belonging to the Modernism, and they represented modern Shanghai’s senses in their works. Shanghai, which they expressed, contains the splendor of international cities, decadence, capitalism, greed, opium, and prostitution, but the two writers’ senses are common in nihilism and disillusionment. Kim Kwangju despaired the fact that the patriotic governors of Joseon are living a fallen life unlike their aspirations. Yokomitsu Reich also experienced the realities of the Japanese imperialist through the 5・30 affairs and despair of ‘Asianism’ and Japanese militarism. Their novels have a different gap between empire and colonialism, but they reach a common point of ‘nihilism’ through different experiences and despair.

베르그손의 도덕과 종교의 두 원천은 우리에게 주체화에 관한매우 독특한 이론을 제시한다. 이에 따르면, 인간이 자신의 실존을장악하는 주체가 되는 것은 종교를 통해서이다. 지성적 동물인 인간은 인간의 존재가 무의미한 세계 표상을 통해 인간을 허무주의의 고뇌에 빠뜨린다. 주체화는 이러한 지성의 자기 해체적 위험에대한 방어적 반작용에서 시작된다. 그런데 베르그손은 두 종류의주체화, 즉 정태적 종교의 작화 본능에 따른 사회적 주체화와 역동적 종교의 신비주의적 직관에 따른 우주론적 주체화를 제시한다. 이 두 주체화 방식에 대한 검토로부터 우리는 주체와 종교의 관계에 관한 다음의 결론들에 이르게 된다. 1) 종교는 주체화의 필수적인 요소이다. 2) 하지만 두 가지 주체화 양태에 따라서 두 가지 종류의 종교가 있다.

In Bergson’s two sources of morality and religion one can find a singular theory of subjectivation, linked to an equally singular theory of religion. Bergson starts from a nihilistic existentialism of mankind being the essentially intellectual animal. Human intelligence gives us the depressing representation of the world, which would destroy our will to live by making us realize the meaningless of our existence in this world. Subjectivation is the defense of the destructive effect of this representation of the world. But there are two kinds of subjectivation, social subjectivation through the virtual instinct of static religion, and cosmological subjectivation by the mystical intuition of dynamic religion. From the examination of these two modes of subjectivation, we have two conclusions about the relation between the subject and religion: 1) Religion is a necessary element of human subjectivation. 2) But because there are two modes of subjectivation, we do not have a religion, but two kinds of religion according to these two modes of subjectivation.

The literary critic Kim Hyeon has postulated that in all of the nihilism that characterized Korean literature (what he termed “undifferentiated nihilism”) after the war and up until the late 1960s, only a couple of author’s works offered the possibility of what he called “salvation.” Kim Sung Ok was one of these authors. Kim Hyeon goes on to characterize the nihilism found in the Korean literature of the period as lacking the potential to provide opportunities for individual growth and lamented the fact that such nihilism was characteristic of Korean literature and was different from the nihilism of Western literature. He did not expound on the nature of such Western nihilism, but it seems evident that he was referring to the affirmative nihilism proposed by Nietzsche. In fact, nihilism was a key element of much of the literature of the twentieth century and was an important element of modernism. One Western writer frequently associated with the idea of nihilism is Ernest Hemingway. In spite of Kim Hyeon’s assertions as to the lack of differentiation of Korean literary nihilism, some Korean writers were by the 1950s and 60s participating in this worldwide idiom, and in fact, Kim Sung Ok produced at least one story that has a very Hemingway-esque quality to it that begs a comparison of the two stories. This paper attempts two things: one is to clarify the natures of these contrasting forms of nihilism and, the second is, through a comparative reading of Kim Sung Ok’s Seoul, Winter 1964 and Hemingway’s short story A Clean, Well-Lighted Place, to discuss how nihilism operates in the two stories in the context of the notion of the possibility of “salvation.”

This study analyzes 2000’s poetry focusing on nihilism. Nihilism has been understood until now as a private, effeminate and decadent emotion. But a kind of Nihilism is various;Benjamin’s ennui that implies on sterility of the world, Lefebvre’s irony which means negative capability. Especially this study gives attention to Nieatzsch’ s affirmative nihilism. Nieatzsch’s affirmative nihilism shows us free play spirit, delight skepticism as a perpectivism and philosophy of positve will. And then nihilism in Korean literature has not been get serious attention. But nihilism is relation to the political and social situation in a age. Nihilism in 2000’s Korean literature is closely connected with ‘1997 system-IMF;financial emergency’. But reality of literary life in poetry is modified unlike direct depiction about a social situation of the novel. We need to look at 2000’s nihilism from this perspective. This study interpret 2000’s nihilism as three angle. noneroticism; sexuality in Kim Un-Hee and Kim I-Dm’poetry, unsuccessful anarchism;irony in Zang Seok-Won and affirmative nihilism;a new poetic analytics in Kim Haing-Swook.

本文試圖從20世紀存在主義哲學的層面，重新展開對魯迅《野草》的討論。以往的硏究，大多側重于强調魯迅作爲中華文化的特殊産物及其作品在中國社會上的現實意義和价値。而本文更注重于魯迅作品中所具有的与同時代相通的世界性意義，以及魯迅作爲一个个体生命所提出的終极疑問。作品中很多因素都印証了我們的觀点。《野草》中的許多形象，不斷而强烈地喚起我們對20世紀西歐存在主義哲學和文學作品形象認同。 以往的魯迅硏究，多數將魯迅所謂"知其不可爲之而爲之"，'反抗絶望'的的人生態度看做他所獨有的精神面貌，幷將此視爲其精神遺産中最爲可貴的部分。本文對這樣的看法也提出了疑問，對'反抗絶望'的實質(本質)進行了重新檢討。 筆者認爲,"反抗絶望"的人生態度, 与尼采 加繆所代表的20世紀"无神論"的存在主義哲學觀点一脉相通。在《野草》中，魯迅戰斗的對象，与其說是社會上的黑暗，不如說是存于人心內的的不可把握与无從抵抗的生命存在本身的虛无。同樣的道理，此一時期他的戰斗的最根本的實質，与其說是"反抗絶望"，不如說是對抗虛无的深渊。注定不能擺脫這"虛无的深渊"的命運，源于他排斥"神"，同時便也喪失了存在的終极依据。這是20世紀"无神論"的存在主義所面臨的必然結局。在排斥而喪失了神的時代，最深刻而强烈的精神追求能到達哪里? 這必然導致无神論者"虛无的掙扎"，這也正是作爲身處20世紀的知識分子 - 魯迅，通過《野草》的世界展示給我們的最可貴的部分。透過這樣的精神，我們看到了魯迅《野草》的无神論的"宗敎性"。

The literary critic Kim Hyeon has postulated that in all of the nihilism that characterized Korean literature (what he termed “undifferentiated nihilism”) after the war and up until the late 1960s, only a couple of author’s works offered the possibility of what he called “salvation.” Kim Sung Ok was one of these authors. Kim Hyeon goes on to characterize the nihilism found in the Korean literature of the period as lacking the potential to provide opportunities for individual growth and lamented the fact that such nihilism was characteristic of Korean literature and was different from the nihilism of Western literature. He did not expound on the nature of such Western nihilism, but it seems evident that he was referring to the affirmative nihilism proposed by Nietzsche. In fact, nihilism was a key element of much of the literature of the twentieth century and was an important element of modernism. One Western writer frequently associated with the idea of nihilism is Ernest Hemingway. In spite of Kim Hyeon’s assertions as to the lack of differentiation of Korean literary nihilism, some Korean writers were by the 1950s and 60s participating in this worldwide idiom, and in fact, Kim Sung Ok produced at least one story that has a very Hemingway-esque quality to it that begs a comparison of the two stories. This paper attempts two things: one is to clarify the natures of these contrasting forms of nihilism and, the second is, through a comparative reading of Kim Sung Ok’s Seoul, Winter 1964 and Hemingway’s short story A Clean, Well-Lighted Place, to discuss how nihilism operates in the two stories in the context of the notion of the possibility of “salvation.”

This paper examines how Everything Everywhere All at Once visualizes excess as both the culmination of and alternative to the collapsing logic of the American Dream. Drawing on theories of materiality, temporality, and affect, it analyzes Jobu Tupaki’s excessive costuming, the narrative device of the multiverse, and visual motifs such as the Everything Bagel and the googly eye to show how excess transforms from accumulation to collapse, and from collapse to care. Through close reading of the film’s aesthetic and formal strategies, the paper shows how the ideological promise of progress and accumulation is rendered as sensory overload, culminating in “ornamental nihilism,” an affective and temporal condition that emerges when accumulated achievements, credentials, and surfaces collapse into meaninglessness. Tracing the shift from this nihilistic endpoint toward an ethics of care grounded in kindness, this paper argues that Everything Everywhere All at Once reconfigures excess from a symptom of racialized failure into reparative politics that resists chrononormative organization, demonstrating how instability and incoherence can become generative frameworks for reading Asian Americanness.

This essay traces the shattering effects of Heideggerian Gestell shown in David Cronenberg’s 1996 film to investigate how the culture of nihilistic spectator can be fueled by human annexation to technology which is akin to the enlightenment impulse gone awry. By reading Crash with the current grappling with technology put forth by thinkers such as Paul Virilio, Fredric Jameson, and Friedrich Kittler, I construe the Cartesian subject as the source of such nihilism. In conclusion, I compare and contrast Deleuze’s conception of time-image with Crash to highlight how the liberating power of the false activated by time-image can serve as a vehicle to navigate the technological wasteland so viscerally visualized in Crash.

This paper examines 'an active nihilism' in Suk-je Sung's novels in detail. The focus of this study is formed from the critical mind in a critical perspective that in Korean novels before and after 2000s, characters who embody 'problematic individuals' of Lukacs have disappeared and those close to 'active nihilists' has become the mainstream. The most representative example of this phenomenon is Suk-je Sung's novels. 'Active nihilists' in his novels are described as 'ascetics' who mastered various spheres such as 'billiard', 'baduk gambling', 'alcohol', 'dance', and 'book collecting', and so on. In the sense that they reject the transcendental conditions of the modern world and live in the space and time of play in which they can display their passion and potentiality to the maximum, they beings jumping over the 'reality principle'. Also, what they want to repeat is not the endless exchange of labor and capital according to the capitalist system of exchange but rather the repeated existence of their power and passion. This 'anthropology of power and passion' is 'active nihilism' which could be expressed as the 'subject of creating new value' and 'Dionysian affirmation' by Nietzsche. Suk-je Sung's novels sharply prove the stylistic essence of 'a novel' which has to create its own form every time, constantly renewing the narrative style of the past ideal model. In this respect, they are very problematic and his innovation of a form draws the attention. Further, this will certainly be the important object of research in the diachronic dimension of contemporary Korean novel.